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 Abstract 
Current thesis will be investigating the different ways of scrutinising European           
Union legislation in the member states. Belgium and the Netherlands have been            
chosen to be the comparative cases in the current study in order to show the               
different outcomes of countries with similar background. The research asks what           
are the main ways of member states to become closely involved in EU affairs and               
what motivates the parliaments to get actively engaged. Theories on the scrutiny of             
EU legislation provide plenty of relevant reasons for close cooperation between the            
EU and member states. Belgium and the Netherlands have very different scrutiny            
mechanisms and the outcome also varies, with Belgian parliament always scoring           
lower than the Dutch one. Investigating the two cases brings out that the reasoning              
for countries is always individual and there is no universal way to evaluate the              
member states all together.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (the EU) has strong political mechanisms for setting common            
standards across the member states. These mechanisms take the interests of all            
member states into account when deciding on new legislation. After the decision            
making processes, it is up to national parliaments to continue with the legislation.             
However, the implementation and scrutinising processes can be complicated and          
often fail to follow the initial deadlines.  
This theses aims to investigate how active are the parliaments in the scrutiny of EU               
legislation and what are the reasons for different outcomes. The focus will be on              
two cases - Belgium and the Netherlands, looking at the scrutiny of EU legislation              
on national level to see their approaches and understand the differing outcomes.            
Combining national and European interests and standards can be a challenge,           
however, in a democratic system it should not be problematic. This topic is             
extremely important for understanding the actual capacity and importance of the           
EU level legislation.  
The cases were chosen as examples of similar cases with a different outcome. Both              
Belgium and the Netherlands were among the founding countries in the European            
Coal and Steel Community and signed the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992.             
Yet, despite a large amount of EU institutions being located in Brussels, Belgium             
fails to keep up with the EU standards, whilst the Netherlands in among the              
exemplary ones.  
The main research questions inquire how is the EU legislation scrutinised in            
member states, how important role do the national parliaments have on deciding on             
EU legislation, and what are the reasons for different scrutiny levels of the member              
states. ​Hopefully, the two cases studied will help to gain understanding of the             
incentives and motivations of member states. 
It is known that after the extensive overhaul in EU debates, institutional scrutiny             
provisions have become more similar in all member states (Auel & Christiansen            
2015, 268), however, they are still not uniform. The administrative challenges that            
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 the member states face need time and support to be solved. There are many              
discourses how democracy works on EU level, many stating that the existing            
institutions are democratically deficit. This can be observed by looking at the            
actions of national governments working beside the EU institutions. The concept of            
democracy is also something that can change depending on the context and is             
perhaps not the most essential in studying the relations between the EU and its              
member states. 
The influence and power of individual states can appear in the way they are              
publicly presented. One possibility for gaining media coverage and political          
attention is holding the rotating presidency of the European Council. Both Belgium            
and the Netherlands have carried the European Council presidency chair for twelve            
times. That is quite an impressive number and it is known that the older member               
states tend to do a good job, be it due to experience or good power position.                
Holding the chair does not automatically indicate being deeply committed to EU            
affairs but it makes the governments much more involved and gives them a straight              
direction to address their political interests. 
With the new institutional provisions that came into force with the Lisbon Treaty,             
the position of national parliaments has grown stronger - for example through the             
Early Warning system that will be explained further on. Nevertheless, there is no             
universal agenda when it comes to making decisions. Members states need to            
balance between the national, and EU level interests, as well as the political             
influences, non-institutional, and non-governmental interests. Maurer and Wessels        
describe it as “multi-level game” (Maurer and Wessels 2001, 33). Much of the             
focus is determined by the motivations of the Members of the European            
Parliaments (MEPs) and this will be one of the perspectives studied in this thesis. 
Members of the Parliament (MPs) are usually considered as rational actors (Auel &             
Christiansen 2015, 269) - they make decisions that will advance their preference.            
There still remains the discussion if there is actual united European agenda that the              
MPs are following. Institutional and actor-centred factors are both important in           
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 their operating in the EU, the question remains, what is the balance between             
‘internal power’ and scrutiny of EU legislation? 
Authors have argued for different motivations behind MPs and the extent of their             
influence in European affairs. Gattermann and Hefftler look into the motivation and            
behaviour of European politicians in the Early Warning System (EWS). EWS is a             
recent change that provides parliaments with more extensive rights to intervene in            
EU policy-making (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 305). The authors explain that so            
far the existing research has focused on the institutional capacity as the main             
determinator of submitting reasoned opinions within the EWS and propose that           
national parliaments’ political motivation also plays an important role. However,          
the additional drivers for participation remain unclear - there seems to be a             
combination of conditions that motivates governments to work.  
Party political contestation plays a role inside the parliamentary chambers for their            
activity in the EWS (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 319). The results of the research              
by Gattermann and Hefftler indicate that the EWS is considered a channel to voice              
concerns (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 321), not merely a technical procedure of            
judicial control. The length of EU membership also has a positive effect on the              
probability to submit a reasoned opinion (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 322), so            
both the Netherlands and Belgium should show good figures here, but Belgian            
results appear modest in contrast to the relatively high activeness of the Dutch. 
Eurosceptic Members of the Parliaments appear to be more incentivised in taking            
action on EU issues (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 308), which can be explained by              
wanting to gain support from their voters at the next election. The voice of              
euroscepticism is very strongly heard in the public and the topic is very convenient              
for politicians to gain their ground. 
National parliaments are also more likely to be interested in drafting new legislation             
rather than amending or repealing existing legislation (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015,           
308). New legislation implies high relevance and policy impact, hence the interest.  
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 The country’s economic condition is another important indicator in showing          
interest in EU matters. When the economic recession hit Europe in 2009, national             
parliaments were less incentivised to submit reasoned opinions on EU level           
(Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 310), keeping their focus on national issues. Stronger            
national focus during challenging times helps to build trust between the people and             
the government. MPs can benefit from this kind of behaviour in many ways -              
gaining support from voters and other party members. 
The authors conclude that MPs’ incentives and awareness are the main factors that             
encourage scrutiny in the EWS (Gattermann & Hefftler 2015, 323-324). Political           
motivation hence seems to overpower the capacity in the matter of the degree in              
which the national parliaments become involved. Despite the short time period, the            
EWS has become a very useful tool for the national parliaments and administrations             
to influence EU affairs (Högenauer & Neuhold 2015, 336, 349). Especially           
important is the effect that administrations have within the national parliaments in            
promoting the discussion of European issues (Högenauer & Neuhold 2015, 351).  
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 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Attitude, authority, and ability 
The theoretical framework was developed by Born and Hänggi, who used it to             
investigate parliamentary control over the use of military force (Born & Hänggi,            
2004). The framework allows for in-depth comparisons between national         
parliaments whilst not neglecting their different practices and cultures (Huff 2015,           
398). The authors used three criteria of attitude, authority, and ability as the basis              
for evaluating parliaments (Huff 2015, 398).  
Introducing the framework, attitude contains political salience and party         
politicisation, domestic parliamentary culture (Huff 2015, 406). The rights,         
resources, and expertise alone are not sufficient to guarantee effective scrutiny           
procedures, political willingness to use the mechanisms and tools at their disposal is             
another crucial precondition (Born & Hänggi, 2005, 11). Attitude is more difficult            
to measure but it is considered the most important combining the function of the              
other two criteria. 
Authority refers to the formal powers that are available to parliaments regarding            
legislation and scrutiny (Born & Hänggi, 2005, 4). Authority can be subdivided            
into budgetary control, ​post hoc powers, and ​ex ante powers (Huff 2015, 400-401).             
Born and Hänggi view scrutiny as an extremely important function of parliament,            
giving the parliament opportunity to hold the national government accountable for           
its activities (Born & Hänggi, 2005, 5). Scrutiny can be viewed as a way to               
compensate for the sidelining of traditional legislative functions. It is also known            
that for most parliaments the scrutiny role still appears to be a challenge. The              
ability to issue mandates remains the most potent instrument available to individual            
parliaments to exert influence over.  
Ability is identified by support and resources available to parliaments (including           
staff and expertise) that enable them to make use of the formal authority (Huff              
2015, 402). Usually parliaments have only small support staffs, whereas the           
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 governments can rely on large bureaucracies. The lack of resources can restrict            
parliaments from collecting direct information on their own.  
 
1.2 Europeanisation, (de-)parliamentarisation 
Europeanisation is mainly seen in the larger scale adaption to the EU level:             
institutionalisation of European norms and values, and pursuing foreign policy on           
EU level. It can be argued what actually are the norms and values that are referred                
to as European. Quite often these are associated with multilateral interests, rather            
than national ones. Along with europeanisation, appears the concept of          
deparliamentarisation, which is considered a contradictory effect of integration         
(Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008, 4-5).  
Deparliamentarisation debate has focused on the question whether European         
integration is causing reduction of importance of national parliaments (Buzogany          
2010, 2). Both of these developments have been part of a move towards             
supranational state-building ​that also limits national sovereignty. Andrew        
Moravcsik agrees that the European integration is leading towards weakening          
parliamentary powers (1994), he sees the danger mainly in extensive international           
cooperation (Buzogany, 2010, 3). It is inarguable that national parliaments have           
ceded their powers both to the EU and also to the domestic executives (Goetz and               
Meyer-Sahling 2008, 5), however, this does not automatically make the national           
powers weaker. On the contrary, active participation in supranational         
decision-making can instead strengthen the position of national executives at the           
domestic level (Moravcsik 1994, Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008, 6). 
 
1.3 Institutionalism (neo-institutionalism) 
A number of papers conducted in the last two decades agree on the importance of               
domestic institutional strength and Euroscepticism as important factors regarding         
the institutional capacities of parliaments in EU affairs (Auel et al. 2015a, 286).             
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 Buzogany (2010) brings out the neo-institutional theories that bring together          
different logics of action and factors, while not holding a too narrow of a focus. The                
three approaches are rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and         
sociological institutionalism (Buzogany 2010, 9). The domestic and international         
levels are also differentiated, explaining the communication and connection         
between the two. 
Rational choice institutionalism includes variables of the type of government,          
opposition parties and their influence, and also splits within governing parties           
(Buzogany 2010, 9). It is strongly focused on explaining how the rules of the              
parliament affect the behaviour of legislators (Hall and Taylor 1996, 944). The            
motivations of parliamentary actors are linked to cost-benefit calculations         
(Strelkvov 2015, 358) in order to find ways to maximise their gains. Euroscepticism             
within party groups can be one example of this kind of behaviour.  
Historical institutionalism introduces the incremental nature of political change.         
The focus is put on the contingent temporal factors. Historical institutionalists state            
that at the heart of politics lies the conflict for scarce resources among rival groups               
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 937). From the path-dependency perspective, it is important            
to look at reactions of national parliaments to EU level changes (Buzogany 2010,             
10). The approach proposes that parliamentary strength is the main if not the only              
necessary condition that makes a strong scrutiny system.  
Sociological institutionalism underlines the public opinion towards the EU, the          
salience of European issues, and party positions. It is found that Eurosceptic public             
opinion is among the factors that explain tighter scrutiny procedures (Raunio,           
2005). 
 
1.4 Principal-agent model and agency theory 
The principal-agent framework is built on the assumptions of rational choice           
institutionalism (Karlas 2012, 1098), which state that political actors are rational           
and take into account the efficiency of their collective action. Hence, the            
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 principal-agent model is used in the EU to ensure better results while trying to fulfil               
common interests. Due to the significance of the model in explaining scrutiny            
mechanisms, it stands here separately. Several studies have used the principal-agent           
model and agency theory when analysing parliamentary control in EU affairs. The            
model is suitable to characterise the relationship between countries and          
international organisations and has been increasingly employed in the study of the            
EU (Kassim & Menon 2003, 121). Similarly has the agency theory, which assumes             
that politicians care about both votes and policy (Saalfeld 2005, 349). 
The relationships of principal and agent are created when one party enters into an               
agreement with a second party and the principal starts to delegate responsibility for             
its functions or tasks to the agent (Kassim & Menon 2003, 122). Delegation is              
important in many aspects, e.g. in improving the quality of policy when            
responsibilities are delegated to a special agent, also to displace some of the             
responsibility for unpopular decisions, and to overcome problems of collective          
action (Kassim & Menon 2003, 123). Moravcsik argues that the reallocation of            
control over political resources is in favour for those who most often participate in              
international negotiations (1994, 1). 
  
11 
 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research design 
The paper is based on the analysis of previous studies focusing on the scrutiny              
aspects of EU legislation. The extensive literature provides sufficient information to           
map the characteristics of Belgian and Dutch parliaments in EU affairs. The            
research paper follows the MSSD logic, investigating two very similar systems with            
different outcomes.  
There are plenty of theories applied to relationship between EU institutions and its             
member states. The theories used in the paper appeared the most applicable to make              
a compact framework to understand the positions of the parliaments. The           
information gathered after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the latest treaty            
change in the EU, appear the most relevant. The treaty changes are an important              
topic for many authors, who often emphasise that the effect is still very recent and               
needs time and further research to provide more reliable results. 
The research is based on the two main questions. 
1. How is the EU legislation scrutinised in the member states? 
Four outstanding theories of scrutinising EU legislation are presented in the first            
part of the paper. The analysis part presents the scrutiny instruments and models             
based on the findings of Mastenbroek et al. (2014b), Buzogany (2010), and Karlas             
(2012), which allow to compare the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. 
2. How important role do the national parliaments have on scrutinising EU           
legislation? 
This question will be answered by looking at the scrutiny usage of the two countries               
selected for this paper. The analysis will compare the results of Belgian and Dutch              
parliaments in their actions and power positions in EU, and interest in scrutinising             
EU legislation. The background comes from research papers investigating EU          
power mechanisms. Investigating the government system, attitude towards the EU,          
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 motivation of the members of the parliament, and national interests in EU affairs             
helps to understand where do the differences in the cases emerge.  
 
2.2 Instruments for EU scrutiny 
Mastenbroek et al. differentiate common instruments used by parliaments to          
scrutinise within the EU policy making process (2014b, 24). Indirect instruments           
refer to the control of the national government in EU affairs, e.g. participating in              
the Council of European Union. This is often identified as the most crucial task in               
the scrutiny process. Other indirect means include appearing in the European           
Council plenary and also asking questions in the parliaments and evaluating reports            
on the positions of governments (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 24-25). It is not             
uncommon for parliaments to use special instruments that appear useful in their            
system.  
Direct instruments include reasoned opinions, political dialogue, ​and subsidiarity         
checks (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 25). The scrutiny procedure in national           
parliaments usually takes place during the legislative phase of decision making in            
the EU. However, some parliaments try to do it during the pre-legislative phase,             
scrutinising also the consultation documents, Green and White Papers. With treaty           
changes, the instruments of scrutiny are also adjusted, but applying them is still             
dependent on the parliamentary will of getting involved. For example, the           
parliaments differ to a great extent in the level of plenary involvement            
(Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 27). 
The instruments of reasoned opinions (EWS) and political dialogue are the newest            
common ones in the EU arena (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 27) and their application              
is slowly but steadily increasing. Parliaments are expected to give a reasoned            
opinion in case it is considered that the proposal in question disobeys the principle              
of subsidiarity (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 23). Studies show that the political            
dialogue is used more often than reasoned opinions. 
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 Buzogany divides the scrutiny procedures of Member States not to instruments, but            
into two models. The difference emerges in their structural attributes, the           
“bindingness” for the governments , and the inclusion of other parliamentary           
committees (2010, 3-4). The document-based model puts the focus on the           
procedures of parliamentary scrutiny. It does not try to take control of the             
governments’ activity in Brussels but has an impact based on deliberation in            
parliamentary hearings and issuing expert opinions. The best example of this is the             
United Kingdom’s House of Lords, that comes up with policy advise that helps to              
shape EU directives.  
The second scrutiny model is called the mandating-model. The most suitable           
example here would be the Danish Folketing that is known for its minority             
governments. This explains the model: weak governments encountered by a strong           
parliament, focusing on the output - a strong position in the European Council. In              
the model, the parliaments are capable of forcing governments to change their            
positions through issuing mandates or giving strong voting recommendations.  
 
2.3 Analytical considerations 
There is very extensive literature in the many aspects of EU affairs, mainly critical              
approaches to the influence of the Union. The national differences are often sought             
to understand through investigating member states all together or differentiating          
them based on the accession time. The continuing trend with these studies is that              
they struggle to actually make a compelling generalisation. Narrowing the cases           
down to two countries can help to give more thorough ground to the topic.  
Generally it appears that there is little agreement whether national parliaments           
actually play a significant role in European policy-making (Auel et al. 2015a, 282).             
However, recent years have seen multiple changes and growing effort towards           
being more involved in EU affairs. National parliaments have established          
committees and obtained extended rights for being a part of European legislative            
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 proposals. It is essential to look into the trends that are emerging among national              
parliaments, especially with regard to the new tools for scrutiny in EU affairs. 
It is important to consider that only studies that include both countries in their              
research can be considered appropriate for the current paper. Individual reports can            
be useful to gather information and opinions but the data is not applicable for              
comparison. The four theories of scrutinising EU legislation help to get an            
overview of the background of the issue. However, it is a possibility that             
contrasting the theories with empirical findings will not present any useful findings            
to understand the cases better.  
 
2.4 Case selection 
There are studies that have classified national parliaments in terms of the            
institutional strength in EU affairs. North European countries, as well as the            
Netherlands, Austria and Germany are considered strong parliaments. At the same           
time, Southern members states, such as Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Malta            
but also Belgium and Luxembourg, are classified as weak (Auel & Christiansen            
2015, 268).  
Belgium and the Netherlands very clearly stand out as similar cases - both small              
and wealthy Western countries, the founding members of the EU - with different             
outcomes. Looking at two countries that appear very close and alike, yet perform             
extremely differently in dealing with EU affairs, it is important to look into to get               
an understanding of the phenomenon. Belgium and the Netherlands are very           
interesting cases, because there are no two other countries in the EU that are this               
similar but have extremely different mechanisms for dealing with EU affairs. So far             
there are there is little research done investigating those two countries in detail,             
which gives importance to this thesis. 
 
2.5 Data 
15 
 The research relies on primary and secondary data, including reports, scholarly           
literature, such as empirical studies and theses. The paper does not produce any             
original data, but presents information gathered from various papers that have           
looked into the scrutiny of EU member states throughout the years. 
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 CASE COMPARISON 
Belgian legislature takes place in the Federal Parliament, which consists of the            
lower house Chamber of Representatives (​Chambre des Représentantes) ​and the          
upper house Senate (​Sénat)​. Dutch parliament States General of the Netherlands           
consists of the lower house ​Tweede Kamer ​and the upper house ​Eerste Kamer​. In              
both countries, the chambers play a separate role in EU scrutiny, with different             
rules and practices. 
In Belgian Chamber of Representatives and both Dutch chambers, its obligatory to            
adopt all reasoned opinions (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 27). In Belgian ​Sénat​, it is              
important to have proactive dialogue with the government as a way to implement             
indirect control of scrutiny processes (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 24). The EU            
coordination system of the Dutch House of Representatives, the ​Tweede Kamer​, is            
seen as strong (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 9).  
The country’s EU coordination system is based on the following principles: 
“​(1) timely input into EU decision making, (2) prioritization, and  
(3) decentralized responsibility​” - Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 9 
The ​Tweede Kamer ​has for a long time shown interest in being pro-actively part of               
the EU policy making process. The scrutiny starts with the systematic prioritisation            
of European Commission proposals on the basis of their annual Work Programme.            
Another instrument consists of responding to consultation documents ​(​e.g. Green          
and White Papers). The Dutch scrutiny system treats EU legislation equally to            
national bills (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 10-11). It is not rare to use regular              
parliamentary instruments such as hearings with experts, technical briefings.  
The Dutch have come up with a strong instrument to scrutinise EU legislation:             
parliamentary scrutiny reserve (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 13-14), which was          
initiated after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. This gives the ​Tweede Kamer an              
option to ask the government not to make final decisions in negotiations within two              
months after the publication of a legislative proposal by the Commission. During            
the timeframe of 2010-2013 the ​Tweede Kamer adopted 17 scrutiny reserves.           
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 Another important tool used is the EWS that the Dutch refer to as the “subsidiarity               
test” (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 12) and started testing already in the 1990s. The              
report by Mastenbroek et al. finds that despite the pro-activity, it is complicated to              
actually use the developed instruments because of lack of good information about            
the early stages of decision making in the Council and varying level of political              
commitment (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 22).  
Eerste Kamer takes a strict legal stance concerning the subsidiarity checks, while            
Tweede Kamer is more willing to use it as a political tool between political groups.               
The ​Tweede Kamer uses a decentralised system for subsidiarity tests, whereas           
Belgian parliament carries out highly complicated procedures, differentiating        
EACs, sectoral committees, and several administrative levels (Mastenbroek et al.          
2014b, 26).  
These findings show that both parliaments have their own mechanisms how they            
handle the scrutiny processes. The Dutch ones are more outstanding in its            
comprehensive actions, making a good use of the existing instruments, as well as             
developing its own. It has been found that parliamentary party groups play an             
important role in the outcomes of the scrutiny process (Strelkov 2015). The focus of              
the party groups stays on the division of competences in the EU and member states. 
Table 1 introduces the number of direct scrutiny instruments used in both countries.             
The data is obtained form multiple sources including Eurobarometer editions and           
scholarly papers (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 128). The numbers of ​Table 1 show             
much more activity from the Dutch parliament. Belgium’s results appear modest,           
except for the political dialogue in the Lower Chamber. If the number of             
instruments used were to be compared per country, not per chamber, the results             
would be more contrasting, the Dutch parliament scoring twice the numbers than            
Belgian. 
Table 1. Use of scrutiny instruments 2010-2013. Source: Mastenbroek et al. 2014b,            
109-110 
 Dutch Upper Dutch Lower Belgium Belgium 
18 
 Chamber Chamber Upper Lower 
Reasoned 
opinions 
2010-2013 
10 14 5 5 
Political 
dialogue 
2010-2013 
32 18 3 17 
 
What can be concluded from this table, is that the Dutch have adopted the new               
scrutiny instruments to a greater deal and perhaps take this responsibility more            
seriously. The results of Belgium can raise concerns, but it does not fall that much               
behind the EU average (Mastenbroek et al. 2014b, 29). Perhaps the results of the              
Dutch can be considered deviant instead.  
Table 2: The strength of parliamentary scrutiny. Source: Buzogany 2010, 7 
Country Involvement 
of Specialised 
Committees 
Access to 
Information  
Voting 
Instructions 
Scrutiny 
Scores 
Belgium Weak  Moderate Weak 0.17 
Netherlands Moderate Moderate Moderate 0.5 
 
The comparative scale for the scrutiny mechanisms is developed by Buzogany           
(2010) when investigating the scrutiny procedures of new member states and the            
findings show that new member states tend to score stronger than the old ones,              
which is mostly attributed to higher motivation. Belgian and Dutch results here are             
both relatively low, once again the Dutch parliament scoring more than twice the             
number of the Belgian parliament. The low outcome can be attributed to the higher              
effect of the new scrutiny instruments that are more likely to be used by new               
member states, whereas the old states stay true to the old instruments.  
The intensity of involvement of specialised committees in ​Table 2 is based on the              
Statutes of National Parliaments or Rules of Procedures. The second sub-variable           
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 refers to the timing and scope of access of information. The voting instructions             
refers to the “consultative” and “politically binding” categories. The three          
sub-variables were computed to a score presented in the last column (Buzogany            
2010, 6-7). 
The weak involvement of specialised committees in the Belgian parliament refers           
to the document-based model of scrutiny. Concurrently, the strong involvement in           
Dutch parliament attaches it to the mandating-based model. The difference emerges           
in the focus on information processing and content in Belgium’s case and on output              
in the Dutch one. This result coincides with the former finding, that Dutch activities              
stand out in the formal scrutiny instruments. 
The scrutiny strength results, however, appear surprising, especially in terms of           
Netherlands’ low performance on the scrutiny strength, scoring only moderate          
results. Belgium continues on a much lower level of the spectrum. It can be argued               
that the extensive clench of EU legislation system has been the cause of lacking              
debate over EU affairs in national parliaments (Buzogany 2010, 8). For older            
member states, the scrutiny processes can become tedious and disturbing factors in            
their every day workings, hence the lower results.  
Being a part of the EU structure, national parliaments have delegated a share of              
their legislative function to the European level and in order to compensate that, they              
have established provisions to scrutinise their government’s EU policy (Auel et al.            
2015a, 284). The institutional strength is important both in delegation and in            
scrutinising the policies.  
Table 3. Score of formal institutional strength. Source: Auel et al. 2015a, 293. 
 Belgium  Netherlands 
Score of institutional 
strength in EU affairs 
2010-2012 
0.24 0.66 
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 The score of institutional strength measures the strength of the parliaments in EU             
affairs. The score is based on indicators including access to information,           
parliamentary infrastructure, and scrutiny and influence rights (Auel et al. 2015a,           
293). Once again, Belgium shows modest results, while the Netherlands scores           
above average. The parliamentary institutional strength in EU affairs has a critical            
impact on all of the activities that take place in the EU level (Auel et al. 2015a,                 
298). Low score indicates possible difficulties that can emerge when trying to            
scrutinise the governments. 
Table 4. Behavioural regularities of parliaments. Source: Karlas 2012, 1101-1102. 
 Belgium Netherlands 
Scope 1 2 
Decentralisation 1 2 
Influence mechanisms 0 1.5 
Binding character 0 0 
Upper chamber 0 1 
Aggregated value 2 6.5 
 
Table 4 presents the variables for evaluating the control of governments in national             
parliaments. Control of governments is seen as a crucial instrument of indirect            
scrutiny in EU affairs. The explanation for the information presented in the ​Table 4              
is derived from Karlas (2012, 1101-1102). 
The first four variables deal with lower chambers. The score in the scope of              
Belgium refers to the systematical scrutiny of government’s negotiation positions or           
EU legislative proposals, whereas the score for the Netherlands means that both the             
governments’ negotiating positions and EU legislative proposals are being         
systematically scrutinised. The decentralisation score implies that the Belgian         
parliament occasionally involves other standing committees besides the European         
Affairs scrutiny and the Dutch one involves the standing committees regularly.  
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 The score of the influence mechanisms shows that the Dutch parliament uses the             
scrutiny reserves, while at the same time Belgian one does not, nor does it have the                
formal authority to adopt mandates. As the score for binding characters is 0 for both               
parliaments, it means that the governments do not have requirements to consult            
with the parliaments in case they do not follow the national parliaments’ opinion.             
The upper chambers’ value indicates that the Dutch upper value has a positive             
value on the influence mechanism or binding character, whereas the Belgian one            
does not. These results are quite similar to the variables of the lower chamber.              
These results once again present the stronger position of the Dutch parliament. 
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 SUMMARY 
Based on the findings, it is clear that the attitude of individual parliaments plays an               
important role in the level of scrutiny of EU affairs. The toolkit that is prepared by                
the EU institutions can be considered sufficient for the parliaments that are            
interested in becoming deeply involved. The cases propose a remarkable difference           
between a involved and uninvolved parliament in EU affairs. Having enough           
support from the system (ability) and enough political power (authority) does not            
play a role in the instance where attitude is missing. 
It is worth to mention that strong parliaments are much better equipped to put              
emphasis on both the national and European agenda. Like the effectiveness of            
European Council presidency is often considered to be in a positive correlation with             
the level of experience, such is the activeness of scrutinising EU legislation            
expected to be in correlation with the tenure of being part of the EU. Current               
findings, however disagree with the statement. In summary, it appears that even            
when considering two countries, it is difficult to see the common ground for taking              
actively part in the EU affairs. Belgium and the Netherlands have very different             
approaches to scrutinising EU legislation, Belgium focusing on the indirect aspects           
of the process and the Netherlands on the direct ones. 
Despite the wide variety of literature available on the topic, the paper comes to              
conclude that the actions of member states in the EU are still quite unpredictable.              
Different motivations for parliaments to act can be analysed, but they are not             
sufficient to gain sufficient knowledge of the actual situation. The level of            
involvement is constantly changing and this can partly be attributed to the treaty             
changes and the characteristics of parliaments. However, as the experience shows,           
there is much more influence from the workings than the theories can comprehend.             
The theoretical approaches help to understand the basis of what drives parliaments            
to act but the final outcomes depends on the individual examples.  
The thesis reached its purpose identifying the characteristics of Belgian and Dutch            
ways of scrutiny. Belgian parliaments’ focus is more on the formal aspects of the              
scrutiny mechanisms, putting the effort on processing information and discussions          
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 in committees. Dutch parliaments on the other hand are very quick to adjust to the               
new mechanisms that are disproportionately much more researched, hence the          
stronger results.  
Undoubtedly, the topic could be investigated more thoroughly and with different           
focus in the centre. However, this thesis intends to provide a starting point for              
further investigation in the different scrutiny approaches of the two countries. A            
modest recommendation for further research would suggest to focus more on the            
national aspects of policy making that could affect the outcome on policy making. 
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 Uurimus Euroopa Liidu seadusandluse kontollist, juhtumianalüüs Belgia ja 
Hollandi näitel 
Ann Saks 
 
RESÜMEE 
Euroopa Liidu seadusandluse käsitlemine liikmesriikide seas on pikalt esinenud         
avalikus diskussioonis, eriti küsimustega, kui efektiivne see on. Käesolev         
uurimistöö otsib vastust küsimustele, kuidas liikmesriikides Euroopa Liidu        
seadusandlust kontrollitakse ja kui olulist rolli mängivad rahvuslikud parlamendid         
ELi seadusandluse üle otsustades.  
Uurimise alla tulevad kaks riiki Euroopa Liidud institutsioonide keskel - Holland ja            
Belgia - mis on ELi seadusandlust käsitledes väga erinevad. Hollandit peetakse           
edukaks seadusandluse kontrollijaks, samal ajal kui Belgia tulemused jäävad         
tagasihoidlikuks. Kuna riigid on oma olemuselt sarnased, olles mõlemad ka Liidu           
asutajariikide seas, siis on säärane erinevus silmajääv. Autor üritab välja selgitada,           
mis on sellise erinevuse põhjus ja kas see erinevus võimaldab ka mõista, kuidas             
riigid üldse saavad seadusandluse kontrollis kaasa lüüa. Lissaboni lepingu         
ratifitiseerimisega 2009. aastal tuli kaasa ka mitmeid uusi seaduandluse kontrolli          
instrumente ja nende kasutusele võtmine või mittevõtmine lubab samuti         
liikmesriikide huvidest aru saada. 
Teoreetikud toovad välja palju erinevaid põhjuseid, mille alusel riigid ELi          
seadusandlust kontrollivad ja mis on kontrolli eesmärk. Uurimistöös käsitletakse         
Born & Hänggi väljatöötatud raamistikku autoriteedi, oskuse ja suhtumise kohta.          
Liaks käsitletakse euroopaniseerumise ja (de)parlamentariseerimise,     
insitutsionalismide ja printsipaal-agent teooriat. Uurimuse raamistikuks on välja        
toodud kontrolli instrumendid, mille rakendamist saab mõlema riigi puhul vaadelda          
ning võrrelda. 
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 Uurimitulemused võimaldavad arvata, et Euroopa Liidu seadusandluse kontroll on         
väga individuaalne ja sõltub just parlamendi sisesest võimekusest ja tahtest.          
Hollandi ja Belgia näited on olulised just mõistmaks ELi mitmetahulisusest.          
Eriilmelised kontrollimehhanismid annavad teadmise, et seadusandluse kontroll ei        
ole kindlasti mitte iseeensest mõistetav, kuigi kauaaegsete liikmesriikide puhul         
võiks seda eeldada. Tegelikkuses aga paljastub, et uudsuse kadumisega kaob ka           
vajadus ennast tõestada, seega pole nendes riikides ka suurt vajadust end ELi            
asjadega valijate ees tõestada. 
Euroopa Liidu kontrollimehhanism on kindlasti väga huvitav ja oluline teema, mida           
ka tulevikus uurida, eriti uute instrumentide arengu koha pealt. Kui käesolevaid           
juhtumeid ka edaspidi uurida, siis võiks lähenemine kaasata rohkem ka rahvuslikke           
komponente, pannes rõhku riikide eripärale. 
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